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PRESS RESTRICTIONS DURING THE
GULF WAR: "HAIL FREDONIA"*
PATRICK J. SLOYAN**
I want to open this presentation with "Hail Fredonia," those
unforgettable historic words from Duck Soup. Groucho, Harpo,
Zeppo, and Chico go to war. Who can forget George Kaufman's
wonderful Hollywood set scene where a thousand people are sing-
ing at the top of their lungs, "We're going to war." If you could
grab that energy and translate it into political gain-which is what
politicians are always trying to do-you could be very successful. I
refer you to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her first term:
going way down in the polls; voters were troubled with her con-
servative government; people in her own party didn't like her-she
was so inflexible. And then she had this wonderful Argentinean
general, the wonderfully desperate General Galtieri, who seized the
Islas Malvinas, which in Britain of course are the Falkland Islands.
Rather than seeking some "wishy-washy" diplomatic settlement to
the dispute over these God-awful islands-8000 miles away, inhab-
ited only by sheep and a few British plots-she launched the Brit-
ish navy, and the British army, and the British commandos, and
the British Air Force on the Falkland Islands. It took unforgetta-
ble debate in the House of Commons, where the defense minister
stood up and said, "It's going to take a long time to do this-it's
8000 miles away." And one of the labor opponents stood up and
said, "I don't remember Nelson saying how far Trafalgar was." At
the end of that war, Thatcher was a cinch for reelection. There
were some casualties then. Since then, American politicians, and
all politicians, look at transforming war fever into political success.
It's very difficult to do, believe me. I think President Bush was
confronted with this with the Gulf War.
You remember suddenly that Saddam Hussein had invaded
Kuwait. But, for more than three weeks, Saddam had troops
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poised on the border of Kuwait. And two days before the actual
invasion, the Central Intelligence Agency told the President that in
fact these troops would invade. So you all remember President
Bush's announcement to Saddam Hussein that if he invaded Ku-
wait, the United States would invade Kuwait, would invade Iraq,
and throw the Iraqis out by military force? You don't remember
because he never made that statement. There are many people,
even in the President's own Administration, who think that had
Bush issued a warning prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Saddam
Hussein would not have invaded. But Bush never made that very
tough, clear statement. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the
President was caught asleep at the switch. His diplomacy had
failed. A former ally had threatened the world's reservoir of oil.
So what can you do? What's the way out of this? How can we
make war, a military solution, acceptable? This ignores the merits
of whether the sanctions would have worked in a year, or whether
you would have needed the military. I personally think that Sad-
dam Hussein was going to leave Kuwait only when this allied, ar-
mored force came in and threatened to destroy his army. I think
the decision to go to war was inevitable. But how can you, in this
day and age, justify the United States going to war? Well, you
need a little "Hail Fredonia": we turn Saddam Hussein into Adolf
Hitler; we appeal to the romance of going to war, the thrill of going
to war, the danger of going to war. And it resulted in a national
response that statistically came out to 89% approving the Presi-
dent's decision to crush Adolf Hitler, to cut off his army in Kuwait,
as General Colin Powell said, to "kill it."
But the downside to war is also very well known. One of the
best examples, of course, is the Vietnam impact on politicians. I
think the Vietnam war was the principal reason President Johnson
left office. And a key part of that widespread opposition to the Vi-
etnam War was the television cameras and the eyewitness accounts
of war. Because the downside of war is the death of human beings,
it's tragic, whether they're Iraqis, or Americans, or Vietnamese.
One death is one too many. And if that death can be seen, then
people will revolt against killing people for diplomatic and political
reasons. It's very difficult to win support to kill people.
So what you want, then, is to devise a war where no one dies;
where no one is killed; where there are no bodies; where there is no
blood. And that's what President Bush did during Desert Storm.
He had to figure out a way to keep those cameras, those reporters,
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those eyewitness accounts from presenting the tragedy of human
death. If you sit back and think about it, this is a very sophisti-
cated, skilled operation. How can you force the most powerful
group of television and newspaper organizations in the world to
submit to total censorship? To unconstitutional censorship? What
kind of political power do you need to do this? Well you don't. All
you have to do is outwit them. They're not that smart. First of all,
con them; tell them, "You're going to get special treatment; we're
going to put you in the pool; and the pool will be taken up to the
front, and you'll be the only one with pictures;.. ." "Oh, I want to
get into that pool!" So the press is divided against itself.
There was no organizational approval of the pool system. I was
a leading and bitter opponent. I enlisted my colleagues at the
Washington Post, the New York Times, the Times-Herald which
owns Newsday. I said, "Where are our lawyers on this? This is
more than an abridgement of the First Amendment." So the law-
yers got together, and a colleague at the Post came back and said,
"Listen, we have no case here because the First Amendment law-
yers, defenders of the faith, are out there trying to make it a capi-
tal offense for breaking open newsstand boxes, or trying to figure
out some outrageous way to increase cable rates." There was a to-
tal zero reaction from this high-powered legal establishment, and I
hope that some of the professors pass that along to these lawyers.
So there was no organized or common sense effort to prevent this.
By conning the establishment press into going along with this
pool system-this total censorship-Bush succeeded in preventing
publication of a single photograph, strip of video or eyewitness ac-
count of the brief but bloody ground war during Operation Desert
Storm. News dispatches and film were delayed for days or, in most
cases, simply lost by the U.S. military-I think deliberately. So
what has resulted is a war which was acceptable because no one
died. And future wars will be acceptable because they're bloodless
through this presentation of government footage which the net-
works project as the war: the smart bombs; the bridges on which
there's no one being destroyed by smart bombs; these sterile build-
ings which evaporate, and apparently with no one dying inside.
Now, every once in a while, something went wrong, for example,
the Amiriya shelter, where civilians were killed and photographed
as they died.
The United States government has been doing this since Ron-
ald Reagan sent troops into Grenada. I had two colleagues who
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
took a boat to where the fighting was underway. They were
promptly arrested by military police, put in a prison aboard a ma-
jor warship (I think it was the command ship for the American
fleet down there), and held incommunicado for two days. All the
news that came out of Grenada came from official, government
footage. This was a total black-out of the press.
The trial run for Desert Storm happened in Just Cause in
Panama. The pool system which was supposed to be representing
me and the rest of the press arrived in Panama after the war was
over-very deliberately. When the GIs went down, we were sup-
posed to have access to watch the troops in combat and report
back what happened. But the pool reporters ended up coming in
ten hours late, and then their only source of information was a tel-
evision set which showed the Pentagon briefing from Washington.
(Notice that the Pentagon briefings from Washington and the
CentCom briefings from Riyadh dominated the flow of informa-
tion.) The reporters themselves were controlled and blocked, and
their dispatches censored and delayed. As a result, you end up to-
day with a war that has no real dimensions, where the death toll is
still in doubt, where the successes are still in doubt. I think the
provocative point of discussion here is not what the press is going
to do about this, but what institutions like St. John's and the law
are going to do. What are the realities here? Are we going to have
manufactured, manipulated wars as part of the American way of
life?
I think there's a lot of misconception among the public that
this hostility exists between the press and the military. It does not.
Every time I have gone to either a private or a colonel or a general
who's involved in the battlefield, they are warm, they are receptive,
they are hospitable, they are candid. They all too often tell the
truth. So that was never a problem in Vietnam, it certainly was not
a problem here in the Gulf. If you could get away from this lock-
step censorship program they imposed on you or if you went out
by yourself as an individual, you found that out very quickly. It's a
truism that a lot of soldiers are proud of what they are doing and
want to talk about it. All the accomplishments-and there were
some significant ones during the Gulf War-were hidden by this
pool system censorship. Particularly during the ground war, there
were a number of heroic acts: people who risked their lives; people
who died during the war exceeding the limits of their expected




What's going to happen in the future? I would like to say I
don't think there's going to be another war. Then again, the next
one will probably be in the same area, another war over oil. And as
that finite resource declines, goes up in value, there'll be more wars
there. Hopefully, smaller ones or ones that will be snuffed by
diplomacy.
But one of the reasons I won the Polk award is because after
the war had ended, I was so convinced that they had covered up so
much, and hidden so much through this censorship pool system,
that I spent May 1991 until February 1992 just reporting what you
didn't know about Desert Storm. My Newsday readers here are fa-
miliar with a lot of them, but one of the reasons my other col-
leagues did not is that they went off and wrote books. They've just
about finished their books. But I hope their books aren't as unin-
formed as some people in the Army are today, some people in the
Marines, some people in the military, who, in strangling efforts by
journalists in getting if not the truth, then the facts, have blinded
themselves. When I found out about the 1st Mechanized Infantry
Division's two-day effort to bury Iraqi troops during the initial as-
sault into Iraq, that was news to Colin Powell. He did not know
about that. It was a rehearsed, elaborate assault, but it never made
its way up the Chain of Command. When twenty-four Americans
were killed by friendly fire during the ground war, Norman
Schwartzkopf didn't find out about that until about May, when
families and what they call the buddy network started getting
feedback from their friends and buddies in the army that this
wasn't Iraqi fire, that this was allied fire, "friendly fire."
The institutions as a result have blinded themselves. The les-
sons learned out of Desert Storm are going to be very, very vague.
It's hard to criticize what went on because the dimensions of this
war are still unknown. Far fewer people died; I don't think there
were 100,000 Iraqis killed during this war. An Air Force general,
Charles Horuera, conducted an almost secret body count. I didn't
find out about this until months later. This convinced him that at
the maximum 25,000 Iraqis died-more bodies just weren't there,
they couldn't find them. He had 2,100 Forward Air Observers with
the ground forces, and they reported back to him, "We don't see
any bodies." There was a much smaller Iraqi deployment in the
battlefield than the Administration led you to believe. Half to 70%
defected after the air war started, left the theatre. You ended up
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with an Iraqi army of 200,000 by the time the ground war began.
We know we can account for 87,000 of those because that's how
many surrendered. General Horner, who conducted the air cam-
paign, then said to me, "If 87,000 came to us, how many do you
think ran the other way?" Maybe more. If you started off with
200,000, you're down to just a handful of troops left on the battle-
field. His forward air observers just did not see the number of cas-
ualties involved. I think that there were a lot that were buried in-
stantly during operations. I think I know an area where most of
the Iraqis did die. But, what are the dimensions of this war? I
can't tell you yet. My colleagues who raced home to write books
that are on the verge of printing-what are those books going to
tell you?
I think they manipulated the journalistic establishment in a
dramatic, sophisticated, and skillful way in preventing us from do-
ing our job. Now, I think the same sophisticated, manipulative skill
is going on with people who are going to write books. That's not to
say that the authors of these books are not men and women of
integrity and honesty and are searching out the best information.
But they're going to people who don't know the true story of De-
sert Storm. They only know bits and pieces. There's been no pub-
lic amassing of basic facts. So I think there's going to be a lot of
bad scholarship. I can think of my colleague Bob Woodward (who
was instrumental in breaking Watergate and the downfall of Rich-
ard Nixon), who knows very little about military affairs. But by
Secretary Cheney giving him entre into the secret negotiations and
debates and comments before the war began, Mr Woodward pro-
duced a book in which he described Mr. Cheney as "the military
mind behind this left-swing invasion of Iraq," which of course was
designed, invented, pursued, and implemented by Norman
Schwartzkopf and his staff. But that a distinguished reporter
would say that it was Dick Cheney who came up with this idea is a
direct result of Cheney telling him that he-Cheney-came up
with the idea. But my view of Mr. Cheney is that his military ex-
pertise came from one of the four universities he attended while
obtaining draft deferments during the Vietnam War; he must have
majored in military science. I don't even think he was in the Boy
Scouts, much less devising strategic left-hooks into the flank of the
Iraqi enemy.
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